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A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE OF TORT LAW
by Robert H. Sutnick*
With all of the force of an idea whose time has come, the concept
of no-fault insurance has confronted the legal community. Articles ap-
pear suggesting -that the law of -torts is incapable of responding to con-
temporary society's accident problem and should therefore be replaced
with no-fault, pay off mechanisms.' Law schools facing the advent
of no-fault -legislation are discussing cutting the hours allotted to the
first-year torts class.' Perhaps most revealing, many members of the
plaintiff's bar are seeking to diversify their practices.3
Those advocating no-fault legislation conceptualize the purpose of
the law of torts as a crude attempt to allocate losses.4 A typical ex-
* A.B., J.D., LL.M.; Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University of Los Angeles.
1. See, e.g., Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allo-
cation of Costs, 78 H~Av. L. REV. 713, 716-21 (1965); Farris, Possible Reforms in
Civil Justice Procedure, 3 CAN. B.J. 126, 133-34 (1960); Fleming, The Collateral
Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1478, 1478-485
(1966); James, The Columbia Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents: An
Unanswered Challenge, 59 COLuM. L. REV. 408, 424 (1959); Marx, Compensation In-
surance for Automobile Accident Victims: The Case for Compulsory Automobile
Compensation Insurance, 15 OHIO ST. L.J. 134, 136-38 (1954); O'Connell, Taming
the Automobile, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 299, 311-13 (1963). The entire literature discuss-
ing no-fault proposals and the tort law relates to one tort-negligence. Thus, refer-
ences to the "fault system" do not encompass the entire body of tort law, they encom-
pass only the tort of negligence. Indeed, the no-fault tort discussion is relevant to only
one facet of tort litigation-automobile accidents.
2. See York, The Law School Curriculum Twenty Years Hence, 15 J. LEGAL ED.
160 (1962), in which the reduced unit credit for the required torts class is advocated.
3. See, e.g., Auerbach, The Trial Bar: Secret Weapon for Highway Safety, TRIAL,
Dec./Jan., 1968-1969, at 58; Haring, The Profession after No Fault: What Grist for
the Mill?, 44 N.Y. ST. B.J. 145 (1972). See also M. MAYER, THE LAWYERS 269-71
(1966); Comment, On Stage Automobile Insurance, TRIAL, Feb./Mar., 1968, at 26; A
Timid Step Toward Reform, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 29, 1970, at 82-83.
4. The two principal sources responsible for the creation of this perspective are:
G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970) [hereinafter cited as CALABRESI];
R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIS PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIc VICTIM (1965) [here-
inafter cited as KEETON and O'CONNELL]. See also J. FLEMING, ThE LAW OF TORTS
9-14 (3d ed. 1965); Calabresi, Does the Fault System Optimally Control Primary
Accident Costs?, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 429 (1968); Calabresi, The Decision for
Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARv. L. REv. 713
(1965); Ehrenzweig, Negligence without Fault, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1422 (1966); Morris,
Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172 (1952).
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pression of this view was enunciated by John G. Fleming:
The toll on life, limb, and property exacted by today's industrial opera-
tions . . . has reached proportions so staggering that the economic
cost of accidents represents a constant . . . drain on the community's
human and material resources . . .. The principal, nay paramount,
task of the law of torts is to play an important regulatory role in the
adjustment of these losses and the eventual allocation of their cost.5
Those advocating no-fault often set up the following hypothetical ex-
ample of Peter and Dover. Peter is driving south on a major boule-
vard. He has both hands on ,the wheel, and he is watching the road
and observing the speed limit. Dover is driving north on the same
boulevard. He too has both hands on the wheel and is watching
the road and observing the speed limit. But as the cars pass, Dover's
car swerves and crashes into Peter's vehicle. As a result, Peter incurs
property damage of $2,500 -to his oar and $3,000 worth of personal
injuries. Dover's car sustains $1,500 damage, and Dover himself sus-
tains injuries of $2,500.
Having established a factual situation, the proponents of no-fault pro-
ceed to assault the present fault system. They argue that the system
makes little economic sense by pointing out that the present system
places the loss on one or two persons (Peter and/or Dover), or their
respective insurance companies;" and by emphasizing the built-in poten-
tial for a long delay between injury and compensation, they correctly
urge that such a delay is both economically inefficient and inhumane.'
Additionally, they point out that the system is administered at great
public expense,8 while failing either to spread the losses among the
masses (reducing the cost to very little per individual) or to distribute
losses on a progressive scale (insuring that those who have more pay
more).' Further, they contend, the system makes no human sense. 10
The courtroom and the lawyer are placed between the plaintiff and the
money needed to pay for the cost of the accident." An individual is
5. J. FLEMING, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 1 (1967).
6. W. MEYER, DOLLARS, DELAY AND THE AUTOMOBILE VICTIM 79-131 (1968) [here-
inafter cited as MEYER].
7. Id.
8. Id. at 3-26. See also KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 4, at 1-5.
9. The various methods of loss spreading are analyzed in CALABRnsI, supra note 4,
at 46-50. For a critique of a socialized system of loss spreading, see Note, Compensa-
tion for Personal Injury in New Zealand, 18 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 196 (1969).
10. See W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM
55-58 (1965).
11. See notes 4-10 supra and accompanying text.
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trapped between the long delay of the courtroom 2 and the tender
mercies of the insurance adjuster.13  This is particularly true of the
poor,' 4 for whom the world of legal procedure and judicial ritual is most
foreign.' 5
On the other hand, there stands the adherents to a school of thought
which points to the moral concept of fault as the basis of the law of
negligence.' The history of the fault concept is familiar. Its heyday
was in the nineteenth century when it (through the tort of negligence)
was used to justify the denial of recovery to workers in developing in-
dustries, such as the railroad industry. The defenses to negligence-
assumption of the risk, contributory negligence, the fellow servant rule
-were effectively employed to defeat recovery.'7 The maimed and
the disabled frequently went uncompensated because of their own fault
or the fault of a fellow worker. Thus ,the fault concept insured that
the law would serve 'as a protector of the industrial revolution.
Perhaps this use of the fault concept can be historically justified.' 8
Perhaps the untrampled development of the modem industrial state
was more important than concern for its victims. Certainly accidents
were bound to occur, and developing industries were inevitably lax in
the application of safety standards scarcely yet developed. Any need
to explain away or justify ,the existence of a host of uncompensated
workers and consumers could be achieved with the quasi-religious con-
cept of fault. Much of the durability of the fault concept is clearly
related to its religious origin in the Judeo-Christian value system which
has historically dominated Anglo-American thought. This can be seen
12. The leading work on the courtroom delay is H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN, AND B. BucH-
OLTZ, DELAY IN THE COURT (1959). See also Kalven, The Bar, the Court, and the Delay,
328 ANNALS OF CONG. 37 (1960); Rosenberg & Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of
Personal Injury Litigation, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 1115 (1959).
13. MEYR, supra note 6, at 42-43.
14. E.g., Briar, Welfare From Below: Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare System,
54 CALIF. L. REv. 370 (1966). See D. CA, Lovrrz, THE POOR PAY MoREt 170-78 (1967);
I. CARIN, J. HOwAi & S. MESSINGER, CIVI JUSTICE AND THE POOR 63-70 (1970).
15. See note 4 supra; Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money and the Law:
A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1961).
16. A typical example of the moral fault argument is: Mancuso, Fault-A Basic
Requirement of Sound Public Policy, 38 INS. COUNSEL J. 397 (1971).
17. J. FLEMING, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 138-41, 145-47 (1967); F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1191-92, 1199-1200 (1956); W. PROSSER,
LAw OF TORTS 450, 550-54 (3d ed. 1964).
18. See note 17 6upra.
19. See A. HARDING, A SoCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 236-37 (1966).
20. See K. ERImSON, WAYWARD PURITANS 47-64 (1966).
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with but a glance at the historical thought of the English speaking
peoples,' 9 with influences such as Puritanism"° and, indeed, with the
very concept of a righteous God rewarding good works and punishing
every fault.21  Thus, the concept's success in justifying workers' and
consumers' injuries is quite apparent when one considers its place in
the religious underpinnings of American society.
As I pointed out above, the advocates of no-fault schemes criticize
the current fault based system as both inhumane and inefficient.
2 2  I
would join with those who could also criticize it as based on the untena-
ble concept of free will. The religious foundation of the fault system
assumes that individuals have a free will which they are capable of ex-
ercising responsibly. While -this assumption can be neither proven nor
rebutted, I would argue that mechanization and institutionalization
have rendered the whole concept of fault primitive. Statistically, one
out of every twenty motorists will be involved in an automobile acci-
dent.23 Consumers, motivated by advertising rather than by knowledge
of quality or design, buy products which appeal to their psychological
needs.24 In short, individuals have little chance to exercise their "free
will."
The proponents of fault assert the existence of a quasi-religious
"free will," while the proponents of no-fault assert that the present
system is a crudely inefficient and inhumane system, of loss alloca-
tion.25 Their debate is intellectually diverting and philosophically
stimulating and brings into play one's deepest philosophical and, even
religious, beliefs. However, despite its diversionary power, the entire
fault/no-fault debate misconceives the historical purpose and present
service of the law of torts. Tort law was not intended to be a philosoph-
ical exercise, nor was it originated as a method of loss allocation. Its
historical purpose was social control.
I. THE POWER TO CONTROL BEHAVIOR-AN HISTORICAL VIEw
Tort law has been used to control behavior for over 2,000 years.
21. See, e.g., 2 Thessalonians 2:8; 2 Peter 3:17; Psalms 19:7; Romans 7:7, 7:12,
8:2. See generally J. ELLUL, THE THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF LAW 37-60 (1960).
22. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
23. Every year 10,000,000 people are injured in automobile accidents; 100,000 of
these injuries are fatal. One out of every twenty Americans will be injured in auto
accidents in a given year. NATIONAL SAFETY CoUNcIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 3 (1958),
cited in Franklin, Chanin & Marx, Accidents, Money and the Law: A Study of the
Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 CoLum. L. Rnv. 1 (1961).
24. V. PACKARD, Tim HIDDEN PEnsuAnnns (1957).
25. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
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Civilizations such as the Babylonian developed an elaborate system
of civil law which detailed the exact amount of compensation for the
torts of assault and battery.2 6  Indeed, even less developed African
-2
1
and North American Indian 28 tribal societies used a similar form of
tort system to redress personal injuries. The purpose of these civil
law systems was to minimize blood feuding which literally threatened
societal survival, or, in other words, to control behavior.29 Tribal units,
threatened by nature and hostile tribes, were dependent upon a com-
munal effort to obtain food and could not afford in-house fighting.
Thus "money," as a symbolic form of retribution, was dispensed
through a tort, i.e., a civil system of law.30 It is important to note
that the civil law system was the only alternative to a lawless society.
The criminal remedies of death, incarceration, or monetary penalty
were unacceptable: they either depleted the chief resource necessary
to the survival of the society-man; or they lacked the symbol of retri-
bution by giving the "money" to the state rather than to the injured
victim.
31
The historical antecedents to our present tort system clearly suggest
that it too developed as a mechanism to control behavior. 32 Examin-
26. The following laws are from the code of Hammurabi:
If a Seignor has destroyed the eye of a commoner, he shall pay one mina of silver.
If he has knocked out a commoner's tooth, he shall pay one-third mina of silver.
If he has destroyed the eye of a seignor's slave or broken the bone of a seignor's
slave, he shall pay one-half his value.
P. ALEXANDER, THu ANciENT WORLD TO A.D. 300 2-5 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter
cited as ALEXANDER].
27. See, e.g., E. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMvE MAN 216-21 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as HOuEL]. See also A. DIAMOND, PRIMrrIVE LAW PAST AND PRESENT 393-94
(1971) [hereinafter cited as DIAMOND].
28. HOEBEL, supra note 27, at 133-40, 155-56, 172-74; K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEREL,
Tim CHEYENNE WAY 47-48 (1941) [hereinafter cited as LUEWELLYN & HOEBEL].
29. See J. BIGGS, THE GUIrT Mnw- 8-9 (1955); DIAMOND, supra note 27, at 94-95;
E. HARTLAND, PmrrrA-v LAw 48-85 (1924); HOEBEL, supra note 27, at 232; LLEWELLYN
& HOEBEL, supra note 28, at 47-48. See also R. POUND, PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 33-34
(1922).
30. ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 2-5; DIAMOND, supra note 27, at 194; LLEWELLYN
& HOEBEL, supra note 28, at 114.
31. See LLEWELLYN & HoEBEL, supra note 28, at 47-48. For an account of this
process in the early Anglo common law, see 1. FLEMING, INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF TORTS 1-4 (1967).
32. ALLEN, THE QUEEN'S PEACE 17-19 (1953); J. FLEMING, INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF TORTS 1-4 (1967); W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 44-45
(1927); H. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAw 15-17 (1966); F. POLLOCK, ANGLO-
SAXON LAw 97 (1957). Under the Roman law system, the damage remedy was used to
control behavior. B. NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW (1962). The Anglo
legal system extensively borrowed from the Roman system. Woodbine, The Origins of
the Action of Trespass, 33 YALE L.J. 799 (1924). The writ of trespass (the first tort
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hag the -tort of negligence, one can conceptualize the institutional forces
of the nineteenth century which both stimulated its development33 and
restricted its breadth. The emerging industrialization of that period
necessarily left a trail of dead and injured workers and consumers."
While a remedy to redress these wrongs was certainly required to
minimize social discontent, industrial expansion could not be sacrificed
in the process. Thus, the law of negligence was shaped to insure -that
only the most meritorious claims would succeed by requiring the claim-
ant to overcome the conditions and defences that the industrial estab-
lishment would assert to bar recovery. 5 In short, the tort of negligence
was used to control behavior-to limit the number of suits which could
be successfully brought against a growing industrial complex.
The use of the negligence tort to protect industrial expansion indi-
cates that tort law responds -to the survival needs of society. The auto-
mation and accumulation of capital which emerged from the industrial
revolution were necessary to ,the survival of a modernized society.
The industrial revolution, however, is over, and once again the term
"survival" has taken on another meaning. It can no longer be viewed
in terms of the protection of industrial development. Survival today
refers to the control of malfunctioning institutions, to preventing ex-
ploitation of the masses which these institutions service. The irony
of the decline of tort popularity is that it has never been in a better
position to respond to the institutional malfeasance which pervades
American society.
Negligence, the specific tort attacked by the loss-allocation/no-fault
proposals, is today developing into a people's remedy. It allows for
an expanded class of persons, irrespective of their status,86 to have
writ) evolved during the reign of Edward I as a mechanism to control internal feuding
which threatened English unity. See W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
357-69 (1927). Trespass on the case developed partly in response to commercial pres-
sures, pressures which envisioned a threat to commercial development if injuries went
unredressed and self-help remedies were employed. See id. at 455-57.
33. See Winfield, The History of Negligence in Torts, 42 LAW Q. REv. 184, 195
(1926).
34. Id.
35. See note 17 supra and accompanying text. These conditions and defenses were
clearly related to the concept of "fault"-only those who had not "sinned" would be
"rewarded" by the industrial establishment. See text accompanying notes 16-25 supra.
36. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1959); Kermarec v. Com-
pagnie Generale, 358 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1958); Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479
P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d
561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968); Beard v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 4 Cal. App. 3d
130, 84 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1970); Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees,
Licensees and Trespassers, 69 LAw Q. RFv. 182, 359 (1953); Prosser, Business Visitors
and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REV. 573 (1942).
19.74]
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standing to sue 7 the institutional giants.3 8  Other torts-products lia-
bility;3 9 nuisance;40 invasion of privacy;41 assault, battery, false impri-
37. Standing to sue for the tort of negligence has revolved around the concept of
foreseeability and the landmark cases of Polemis v. Furness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3
K.B. 560, and Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). American juris-
dictions following Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf have held that the test for whether
or not an injured person has standing to sue for the tort of negligence was to be de-
termined by the court as a matter of law. The specific test employed was whether
or not the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of due care, the duty being determined
by whether or not the plaintiff was foreseeable. Mrs. Palsgraf was held not to be fore-
seeable, and, therefore, she had no standing to raise the tort of negligence. The net
effect of this ruling was to limit the potential class of plaintiffs by excluding third-party
bystanders. The analogy here is to the concept of privity as applied in contract law.
See generally F. DicKERsON, PRODucT LABLrrY AND TH FOOD CONSUMER 163-69
(1951).
The California Supreme Court has recently expanded the class of plaintiffs by estab-
lishing standing to sue for third-party bystanders. See Elmore v. American Motors
Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969); Conner v. Great West-
ern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968);
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). In other
words, the class of plaintiffs to which Mrs. Palsgraf belonged is today foreseeable in
California.
In addition to expanding the class of foreseeable plaintiffs, California tort law has
evolved to the point where plaintiff's problems of proof have been greatly reduced. This
has come about principally through an expanded use of res ipsa loquitur (Bedford v. Re,
9 Cal. 3d 593, 510 P.2d 724, 108 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1973); Fowler v. Seaton, 61 Cal. 2d
681, 394 P.2d 697, 39 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1964); Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.
2d 436, 247 P.2d 344 (1952); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944);
Albers v. Greyhound Corp., 4 Cal. App. 3d 463, 84 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1970)) and the
rewriting of the California jury instructions on proximate cause effectively reducing the
proximate cause argument to a "but for" presentation. See CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUC-
T'ON, Crm § 3.75-76 (P. Richards 5th ed. 1969); see also Greenfield v. Insurance Inc.,
19 Cal. App. 3d 803, 97 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1971); Majetich v. Westin, 276 Cal. App. 2d
216, 80 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1971); Gordon v. Strawther Enterprises, Inc., 273 Cal. App.
2d 504, 78 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1969); Goodwin v. La Turco, 272 Cal. App. 2d 475, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 305 (1969); Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal. App. 2d 213, 157 P.2d 372
(1945).
38. See, e.g., Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, 454 P.2d 244 (Alas. 1969)
(automobile manufacturer); Shannon v. City of Anchorage, 429 P.2d 17 (Alas. 1967)
(municipal government); Cameron v. State, 7 Cal. 3d 318, 497 P.2d 777, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 305 (1972) (state government); Baldwin v. State, 6 Cal. 3d 424, 491 P.2d 1121,
99 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1972) (state government); Ramos v. County of Madera, 4 Cal. 3d
685, 484 P.2d 93, 94 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1971) (state agencies); Jiminez v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 482 P.2d 681, 93 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1971) (large .orporate retail
chain); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629
(1970) (heavy machinery manufacturer); Connor v. Great Western Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968) (savings & loan);
Briggs v. State, 14 Cal. App. 3d 489, 92 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1971) (state government);
Vanoni v. Western Airlines, 247 Cal. App. 2d 793, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967) (airline
industry).
39. See, e.g., Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 629 (1970); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr.
[Vol. 7
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE
sonment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983;42 etc.-provide the same opportunity.
Tort law, then, provides a means of responding to the individual's di-
lemma in ,an institutionalized society. Thus, it is not tort law which
has had its day, but the respective theories of loss allocation and fault
as explanations for the purpose of the tort law which are dated.
II. THE ROLE OF TORT LAW: SoCIAL PROBLEMS AND THE
CONTROL OF INSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOR
The present utility of tort law lies in the power it can exert to con-
trol institutional behavior. Power, however, cannot be discussed in a
vacuum; it is relational to social problems facing American society-
problems of a mass society.
C. Wright Mills has defined his perception of the mass society:
Far fewer people express opinions than receive them. The communi-
cations that prevail are so organized that it is difficult or impossible
for the individual to answer back immediately or reply with any effect.
The realization of opinion in action is controlled by authorities who
organize and control the channels of such action, and the mass has
no autonomy from institutions. 43
Mills, when he wrote of the mass society, said it had not yet come
about in the United States. Now is clearly the time to challenge such
an assertion.44
First, is not contemporary American society dominated by bureau-
cratic institutions? Second, is not American society literally subject to
the dictates of the institutions? For example, do we not, as a people,
consume opinion via the news and electronic media in far greater propor-
178 (1970); Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 579, 454 P.2d 34, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 652 (1969); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37
Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Co., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
40. See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. Martin, 337 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1964); Renken v.
Harvey Aluminum, 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Ore. 1963); Nestle v. City of Santa Monica,
6 Cal. 3d 920, 496 P.2d 480, 101 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1972).
41. See, e.g., Dietman v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); Briscoe v. Read-
er's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971); Fletcher v.
Western Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970); Rugg v.
McCarthy, 476 P.2d 753 (Colo. 1970); Nader v. General Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765
'(N.Y. 1970).
42. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 169 (1960); Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d
358 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969).
43. Mills, The Mass Society, in MAN ALONE: ALmENATION IN MODERN SOCmTY 207
(E. & M. Josephson eds. 1962) [hereinafter cited as MAN ALONE].
44. Bell, America as a Mass Society: A Critique, in THE SOCiOLOGICAL PERsPECTIE
294 (S. McNall ed. 1968).
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tion to expressions of opinion given by citizens constituting the mass?
Is not the communication network, both electronic and printed, heavily
organized and controlled, 5 to the point that it is extremely difficult
to respond effectively? (How effective is a letter to the editor pub-
lished two weeks after the article to which it responds?) Do not certain
vested interests control and dictate 'the channels of opinion?"' (How
many independent newspaper or radio or television channels are util-
ized by unorganized members of the mass?47) Finally, where in mod-
em, urbanized America can one escape the institutions? (Can we
feed, clothe, protect, or service ourselves?) In other words, are we
not living in -the midst of the mass society?
Human relationships are fundamentally different in the institu-
tional48 and modernized49 society. While pre-industrial society em-
phasized individual prowess (man providing for himself), the coming
of industrialization changed this, gathering masses of people into rela-
tively small areas -to service 'the needs of industrialization. What fol-
lowed was the evolution of bureaucratic institutions, 0 to service both
the industrial needs of the community and the social needs of the masses.
Emphasis shifted from man's caring for himself to man being cared
for. (For example, education became institutionalized; a bureaucracy
was needed to administer it.) Industrialization, then, revolutionized
human relationships by shifting to the bureaucracy the responsibility
for one's well-being that had originally belonged to the individual.
When these bureaucratic institutions malfunction-when they serve
their own needs rather than those of the people-social problems oc-
cur; problems which are not individual, but rather are best attributed
45. J. ELLUL, PROPAGANDA 57 (1965). See generally J. COONS, FREEDOM AND RE-
SPONSIBILITY IN BROADCASTING (1961); W. RIVERS & W. SCHRAMN, RESPONSIBILITY IN
MASS COMMUNICATION (1969); H. SCHILLER, MASS COMMUNICATIONS AND AMERICAN
EMPIRE (1970); W. SCHRA M, MASS MEDIA AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1964);
T. SHIBUTANI, IMPROVISED NEWS (1966).
46. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 42 U.S.L.W. 5098, 5100-01
(June 25, 1974).
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., S. EISENSTADT, MODERNIZATION: PROTEST AND CHANGE 22-23 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as EISENSrAYr]; G. SYKES, SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN AMERICA 20-21 (1971).
For an example of institutional malfeasance, see T. WOLFE, RADICAL CHIC AND MAU
MAUING TIlE FLAK-CATCHERS (1970).
49. Modernization is a term used to explain the phenomenon of society changing from
individualistic to institutionalized. The most complete explanation of the term is found
in EISENSTADT, supra note 48.
50. For a discussion of the process of institutionalization, see M. WEBER, THE THE-
ORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1947); M. WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER:
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196-244 (1946).
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to institutional malfeasance. Consider, for example, power companies
that pollute the environment in order to provide more convenience to
the electrically equipped household; manufacturers of consumer items
that produce defectively designed and manufactured goods at the ex-
pense of -the health and safety of the consuming public; and social ser-
vice institutions which police instead of service their clientele.
Thus, mass society places human beings in a situation where they,
as a mass, are dependent upon social, political, and economic institu-
tions for their daily subsistence. Such dependence increases the im-
portance of symbols.51 Man takes more seriously than ever money,
rank, material possessions, clothing, etc., all of which place him in a
relative position of "good" or "bad," "esteem" or "disclaim," in the mass
society.52 For many people, the symbols are of special importance
because they are the avenues into the various institutional social struc-
tures; they are both the vehicle to and the reward of achieving the
status of institutional elites. Net profit is important. Competitive
rank with other institutions is taken seriously. Workers to run the in-
stitutions are selected by means of symbolic scores. Symbols, then,
are the key stimuli to which mass society responds.
A. Frustration of Institutional Behavior
Tort law also has its symbols-money, injunctive orders, and the
stigma of having engaged in illegal behavior. These are all symbols
which can influence institutional behavior. Money, while a symbol,
53
is also the lifeblood of an institutionalized society. Funds are essen-
tial to buy bureaucrats; bureaucracies cannot be run without bureau-
crats. 54 If one can force an institution to expend funds, one can cur-
tail its ability to function according to its internal policy. Thus, forcing
an institution to pay out funds, through the instrument of a damage
award, creates institutional frustration 55-frustration which becomes
the catalyst to coerce policy changes.
51. See White, The Symbol: The Origin and Basis of Human Behavior, in THE So-
CIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 98 (S. MeNall ed. 1968). "A symbol is a thing the value
or meaning of which is bestowed upon it by those who use it." Id. at 100.
52. V. PACKARD, THE STATUS SEEKERS 103 (1959); R. BERGER, MAN-IN-ORGANIZATION
25-26 (1968). See generally W. WHYTE, THE ORGANMAZATION MAN (1956); P. BLAU, THE
DYNAMIcS OF BUREAUCRACY (1963).
53. For a discussion of the power of money as a symbol, see J. KNIGHT, FOR THE
LovE OF MONEY 11-46 (1968).
54. See L. BOGRET, THE AGE OF AUTomATION (1965). For a functional account of
an automated society, see K. VONNEGUT, PLAYER PINO (1956).
55. See P. BLAu, THE DYNAMICS OF BuREAucRAcy 231-46 (1963); S. HAYAxAWA,
LANGUAGE IN THouoirr AN ACTION 271-86 (1949).
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In response to this argument some commentators suggest that institu-
tions have circumscribed the power of the tort suit by their ability to
pass increased cost, including tort damage awards, to consumers! '
This reply, however, cannot withstand careful examination. First, at
some point it becomes more profitable to change behavior than
to continue present policy. A systematic and persistent use of tort suits
could present corporate management with precisely this dilemma.r1
(One example of this process is the change in inspection procedure
made by the airline industry subsequent to a series of successful negli-
gence suits against -them."5 ) Secondly, most consumer institutions are
not economically structured to withstand a consistent barrage of tort
suits, 59 especially when the amounts recovered are substantial." °
Third, these commentators completely ignore the reality of govern-
mental institutions. They not only have fiscal ceilings, 1' but must
ultimately go to the voter to increase their operating budgets."2 Fi-
nally, there is the power to enjoin tortious conduot 0-a remedy
backed by the contempt power.
Thus, it is clear that the law of torts, with its remedies of injunc-
tion and money damages, has the power to frustrate bureaucratic de-
cision-making, thereby forcing institutional change. For at some point
56. See J. FLEMING, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 1-8 (1967).
57. See MACHINERY & ALLIED PRODUCTS INSTITUTE, COUNCIL FOR TECHNOLOGICAL
ADVANCEMENT, PRODUCTS LIABILrTY AND RELIABILITY: SOME MANAGEMENT CONSIDER-
ATIONS 1-11 (1967); PRODUCT AND ALLIED PRODUCTS INSTITUTE, LABILITY AND SAFETY
1-5, 57-71, 79-91 (1971).
58. See Lobel v. American Airlines, 192 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1951); United States
v. Kesinger, 190 F.2d 529 (10th Cir. 1951); Rogow v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 547
(S.D.N.Y. 1959); Capital Airlines v. Barger, 341 S.W.2d 579 (Tenn. 1960); Newberger
v. Pokrass, 148 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 1967); MeLarty, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Airline
Passenger Litigation, 37 VA. L. REV. 55 (1951).
59. See M. MACINTYRE, COMPETITIVE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE UNDER GOVERNMENT
REGULATION 14-19 (1964).
60. Because of pain and suffering and because of punitive damages, recovery can be
exceptionally high. See, e.g., Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d 166, 417 P.2d 673, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 129 (1966); KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 4, at 358-62 (1965); MORRIS,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES 21 (1960); Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1021
(1970).
61. Penniman, The Politics of Taxation, in PoLmcs IN THE AMERICAN STATES 520-
22, 536 (H. Jacob & K. Vines eds. 1971). For an excellent description of how gov-
ernment officials on the federal level have historically sought to conform government
expenditures to government income, thereby creating a fiscal ceiling, see H. STEIN, THE
FISCAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA (1969).
62. See A. WILDAVSKY, THE PoLITCS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (1964).
63. See Comment, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police
Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 14 (1968).
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it becomes the "prudent" course for large institutions to switch rather
than to fight. Legal resistance is replaced by institutional compliance.
B. Stigmatization of Institutional Behavior
Tort suits, in addition to frustrating institutional policy, also stig-
matize, and this stigmatization can be effectively utilized to communi-
cate dissatisfaotion with institutions. Attaching the stigma of "unlaw-
ful" to institutional action can clearly threaten managerial control.' 4
Neither private sector management nor government leaders can sur-
vive in a climate which seriously erodes constituency support.65
Tort suits can only function in this capacity if used as a form of
propaganda.66 Propaganda by definition is any method of communica-
tion which uses folk characterizations prevalent in society to affect
attitudes and behavior. As the ILu Klux Klan uses the characteriza-
tion of racial inferiority to foster racist behavior67 and as commercial
advertisers use the characterization of sexuality to sell products,68 the law
suit can use the characterization of illegal activity to control institu-
tional behavior.
Characterizations are an imposition of values, usually for the pur-
pose of achieving conformity and, therefore, harmony amongst a
group. It is important to note that not only do these folk characteriza-
tions exist in any society, but also that the success achieved in using
them is dependent upon the values of -the group or olass or persons
at which they are aimed. In American society, the characterization
of "illegality" can be quite successful because of the negative conno-
tations it produces. 69  Thus, tort suits can exploit this connotation to
affect attitudes and behavior.7 °
64. See S. ALINsEY, REVEILLE FOR RADICALS 132-54 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
ALwsKY]. For an example of how organized public pressure, the stigma of illegal and
improper behavior, and the initiation of litigation have induced U.S. Steel Corporation
to change its Clariton plant, see Showdown at Clariton, N-wswnnK, Feb. 21, 1972,
at 89-90 (hereinafter cited as Showdown].
65. See ALINSKY, supra note 64, at 132-54; C. BERNs-rEN & B. WOODwARD, ALL THE
PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974); J. MAcGRUDER, AN AmERICAN DREAM: ONE MAN'S ROAD
TO WATERGATE (1974); M. ROYKO, Boss: RiCHARD J. DALEY OF CHICAGO 114-26
(1971); THE WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPTs (1974).
66. The leading work on propoganda is J. ELLUL, PROPAGANDA (1965).
67. Id. at 244.
68. M. McLUHAN, THE MECHANICAL BRiNE: THE FOLKLORE OF INDUSTRIAL MAN
(1951); V. PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS (1957).
69. This negative connotation is largely attributed to Judeo-Christian values, values
which are held by many members of society. See R. KAHN, THE TEN COMMANDMENTS
FOR TODAY (1964); K. ERICKSON, THE WAYWARD PURITANs (1966).
70. It must be stressed that it is the public characterization of the activity that will
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Propaganda, of course, can only be successful if it generates pub-
licity, i.e., if it communicates the characterization.7 1 The Klan
achieves its publicity by word of mouth, by visual aid of hooded fig-
ures, and by such symbols as the burning cross. The advertising
industry uses the media to portray beautiful women or handsome men
in conjunction with their products, all of which are aimed at the sexual
identity crisis prevalent in modem society. Utilizing the law suit as
a propaganda mechanism is also dependent upon publicity, publicity
which characterizes a certain activity as illegal.
C. Avoiding the "Flak-Catcher"
One cannot successfully challenge institutions on a literal person-
to-person level. They cannot be petitioned. They are beyond an ap-
peal to reason. The confrontation which takes place on a literal level
has an effect only on the confrontor -and, what Tom Wolf has so aptly
identified as, the institutional flak-catcher, 2 i.e., the person set up by
the institution to endure the indignities and abuses of outraged clien-
tele. The flak-catcher serves as an invaluable aid -to the discourage-
ment of institutional complaints. One meets the flak-catcher and ex-
pends energy only to find that nothing has been accomplished. 7  The
flak-catcher, of course, is the institutional shield, a mechanism which
gives the illusion of confrontation, but in reality insures ,the status
quo.
74
A tort suit completely avoids the flak-catcher. There is no way
to keep a lawsuit away from management's attention. A lawsuit
is a symbol which 5 is intelligible to those who are in decision-making
positions in bureaucratic institutions and is taken seriously because it
ultimately represents the potential to have money (damage awards),
court orders (injunctions), and the stigma of illegal behavior directed
at the institution. These forces constitute the power of the tort law-
forces to which institutional decision-makers understand and relate.
They are therefore capable of producing a change in institutional be-
havior.
78
be effective. If it is thought that the activity can be successfully accomplished in secret,
the fact that it is "illegal" will not necessarily act as a deterrent. See THE WHITE
HousE TRANsciPTS (1974).
71. 1. ELLuL, PROPAGANDA 102-05 (1965).
72. T. WOLFE, RADIcAL Cmc AND MAU MAUING THE FLAK-CATCHERS (1970).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See note 51 supra.
76. For examples of situations in which damage awards, court orders, and the stigma
of improper behavior have induced behavioral changes by institutions, see Ticklish
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CONCLUSION
Institutions which produce consumer goods are today meeting and
planning how to build safety into their products as a direct response
to products liability and negligence litigation. General Motors settled
and vacated a case involving a design defect for over $500,000 rather
than have the case reported into the case law.77 Police departments have
begun to study the potential impact on morale and efficiency of civil
suits against the department. Public utilities have agreed to pollution
controls rather than fight tort suits in the courts. In short, there ap-
pears to be an institutional awareness which perceives civil litigation as
a threat.
The phrase "the power is in the people" has special significance
in relation to tort law. The courts have become the major political
arena in which people's rights -are being redressed and protected.
Legislative activity has been successfully stifled by the size, cumber-
someness, and inability of legislators to obtain information. The
courts, however, remain as a primary source of governmental power
which people can directly use on their own behalf. Tort law is a very
big part of the people's courtroom power.78  Theoretically, the state,
Treatment, NEWSWEEK, July 30, 1973, at 74-75 (the California Board of Medical Ex-
aminers revoked a doctor's license to practice on grounds of gross negligence as the
result of a $170,000 judgment against him); Showdown, supra note 64 (how public
pressure and the initiation of litigation have induced U.S. Steel Corporation to change
its Clariton plant); Note, Legal Limitations on Miranda, 45 DENVER L.J. 427 (1968)
(how Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), has altered police behavior); Note,
Wisconsin Tuvenile Rights after Gault, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 1219 (how In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967), affected the behavior of the juvenile court process). See generally R.
NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED 1-34 (1972).
77. Badorek v. General Motors Corp., 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970).
78. The literature describing and defining alienation is legion. There is, however, a
consensus which runs through it: that the essence of alienation is man being divorced
from his humanity. See MAN ALONE, supra note 43; R. LANG, TE POLITICS OF Ex-
PERIENCE (1967). Karl Marx, preoccupied with the effect of industrialization on the
worker, described alienation as the "de-humanization of work [which] goes so far that
the worker is reduced to the point of starving to death." Marx, Alienated Labor, in
MAN ALONE, supra note 43, at 95. Eric Fromm defended alienation in terms of man's
relationship to a society which has become
so powerful that it has usurped man's humanity; Man has created a world of
man-made things as it never existed before . . . the more powerful and gigantic
the forces are which he unleashes the more powerless he feels as a human being.
Fromm, Alienation under Capitalism, in MAN ALONE, supra note 43, at 63. Both defini-
tions visualize man as dehumanized because of an institutionalized and technologically
sophisticated society.
Man in mass society is, of course, alienated. See Bell, America as a Mass Society:
A Critique, in THE SocIOLOGICAL PERSPECnVR 294, 295 (S. McNall ed. 1968). The sig-
nificance of the sociological phenomenon alienation to this discussion is that it has pro-
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through the criminal law, represents the people; yet in recent times
how many state initiated law suits have we seen directed against social
problems? People, then, must act for themselves, on their own behalf.
To abdicate or -transfer the individual's ability to represent his or her
own interest is to insure a repressed, and possibly a rebellious, society.
Tort suits are an avenue which groups -and classes of people can use
to have an input into the behavior of institutions which in turn necessar-
ily and unavoidably affect the quality of their lives.
vided, and will continue to provide, the fuel to feed the fire. In order to motivate in-
stitutional response, a continuous volume of cases is essential, for it will take repeated
attacks of damage awards, injunctions, and stigmatization to teach bureaucracies that it
is more "profitable" to alter behavior than to continue present policy. Alienated man
has found a way of responding to the frustration of dealing with the institutional
structure-law suits. There exists a circle of energy which to date has made some
remarkable inroads into altering institutional behavior. See, e.g., note 76 supret. These
inroads have all been made in an unorganized and ad hoc way. If an organized effort
were made, this circle of energy could be used to insure dramatic and far reaching
participatory input from the masses in mass society.
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